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RECENT CASES
BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-PROVISION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.-
MACKINTOSH V. GIims ET AL., 80 ATL., 554 (N. J.) .- Held, that the negotia-
bility of a note is not affected by a stipulation that, on suit or employment
of an attorney to enforce it, an additional sum of six per cent. on princi-
pal and interest shall be paid as attorney's fees.
Courts and text-writers are one in declaring that a note, in order to,
be negotiable, must be certain in amount. Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S.,
434; Phila. Bank v. Newkirk, 2 Miles (Penn.), 442; Story on Bills §§42-45;
1 Parsons' Notes and Bills, 37. Taking the ground that prior to the
maturity of the note. and while it is current in the business world, the
provision is inoperative, and that it is sufficient if the amount is certain
which will discharge the note if paid when due, courts have repeatedly
held that such a provision is not fatal to the negotiability of the note.
Gehlbach v. Carlinville Nat. Bank, 83 111, 129; Shenandoah Nat. Bank v.
Marsh. 89 Ia., 273; Schlesinger v. Arline, 31 Fed., 648. The courts which
oppose this doctrine do so on the ground that such stipulations defeat the
essential requisite of negotiability-definiteness of amount payable. First
Nat. Bank v. Larsen, 60 Wis., 206; Roads v. Webb, 91 Me., 406; Amer.
Mach. Co. v. Druge, 82 Ver., 476. In Woods v. North, 84 Penn., 409, a note
of this character was declared non-negotiable, though the sum to be used
for attorney's fees was fixed and certain. And yet there are a number of
states holding such notes negotiable even though the amount to be col-
lected is indicated only by such indefinite words as "costs for collection",
"reasonable attorney's fees", etc. Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala.,
553; Goar v. Louisville Banking Co., 74 Ky., 180; Stonenan v. Pyle, 35
Ind., 103.
CARRIERS-EJECTION OF PASSENGER-INVALID TIcKET-FoRAl OF AcTIom
FOR WRONGFUL EJECTION.-BALTIMORE AND OHIO R. Co. v. THORNTON, 188,
FED., 868.-Held, a passenger who without fault on his part, but through
the mistake or negligence of an agent of a railroad company. has been
given an invalid ticket, and in consequence is ejected from a train for
which he has paid fare, may recover damages therefore from the company,
vhether the action is on the contract or in tort.
There is a radical conflict of authority as to form of action of a
passenger ejected from a train because of invalid or insufficient ticket.
Some courts hold that a passenger's only remedy for negligence of the
ticket agent is by an action for breach of contract. McKay v. Ohio River
R. Co., 34 W. Va., 65; Lexington & E. R. Co. v. Lyons, 104 Kentucky, 23;
Peabody v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 21 Ore., 121. But the weight of
authority is, as in the principal case, that when the passenger acted in
good faith and is without fault, he may sue the carrier for agent's mis-
take either in tort or on contract. Ellesworth '. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 95
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Ia., 98; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines, 99 Ky., 411; Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Spirk, 51 Nebr., 167; Trice v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 40 W. Va., 271;
Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind., 381. However, when plaintiff has
himself been at fault tort action is denied. Dietrich v. Pa. R. Co., 71 Pa.,
433; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill., 499.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-REGULATION OF TRADING
STAMP BUSINESS.-STATE v. GASPARE ET AL., 80 ATL., 606 (MD.).-Held, a
corporation engaged in supplying trading stamps for use by merchants to
increase their business, and engaged in redeeming the stamps supplied by
merchants to their customers on presentation, is engaged in a lawful
business, and, to justify the state in regulating it, it must appear that the
interests of the public generally require legislative interference, and the
means are reasonably necessary to the purpose and not unduly oppressive,
or the regulations will be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.
The great current of. authority supports the trading stamp business;
that, when honestly conducted, it involves no element of chance, uncer-
tainty, or contingency such as to render it obnoxious or dangerous to the
public welfare. Commonwealth v. Sisson, 178 Mass., 578; Humes v. Little
Rock, 138 Fed., 992; Hewin v. Atlanta, 121 Ga., 723; Winston v. Hudson,
135 N. C., 286; Contra, Lansbnrg s. District of Columbia, 11 App. D. C.,
512. It makes no difference whether the stamps are redeemable by the
selling merchants or third party. State v. Dodge, 76 Vt., 197. But if
stamps are redeemable in articles of unknown or uncertain value, then
the legislative regulation is valid. Dinn v. People, 40 Ill., 465. Further-
more, most courts hold that legislative attempts to regulate this
business by means of license taxes, as in the case of questionable
enterprises, are unconstitutional. Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal., 429; Ex
parte Hutchinson, 137 Fed., 949; Montgomery v. Kelly, 142 Ala., 552. A
few states, however, hold such legislation constitutional. Fleetwood v.
Read, 21 Wash., 547; Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed., 857. And in Canada
a similar doctrine has been expressed. Wilder v. Quebec, Rap. Jud.
Quebec, 25, C. S., 128.
FISH-CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.-STATE v. KOFINES,
80 ATL., 432, (R. I.).-Held, that Pub. Laws 1909, c. 437, par. 1, prohibit-
ing any person from taking any lobster from the waters of the state, or
maintaining any pot or contrivance to take lobsters, unless licensed to do
so, and section 2, authorizing the commissioners of inland fisheries to
grant or refuse licenses to such citizens of the state as have resided
therein for at least one year as they may think proper, subject to revoca-
tion on violation of any of the provisions of the act, are within the police
powers of the state, and do not, either as to citizens of the state or aliens,
violate Const. art. 1, par. 17, providing that the people of the state shall
continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery and the
privileges of the shore to which they have been entitled under the charter
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and usages of the state, but that no new right is intended to be granted
by this declaration. Blodgett, J., dissenting.
Statutes are held to be constitutional unless there is clear proof to
the contrary. Mobile Dry Docks Co., et al., v. The City of Mobile, 146
Ala., 198; Stillwell v. Jackson, 77 Ark., 250. And a statute otherwise
unconstitutional as affecting property rights is valid if it comes within
the scope of the police powers of the state. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y.,
509; Sibley v. State, 107 Tenn., 515; Thorpe v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt.,
140. A state by virtue of these powers may enforce statutes for the pro-
tection of fish and game. People v. Bridges, 142 Ill., 30; Burnhain v.
Webster, 5 Mass., 266; State v. Woodward, 123 N. C., 710. So acts making
unlawful or limiting the use of certain fishing contrivances are valid.
People v. Collison, 85 Mich., 105; Lawton et al., v. Steele, 119 N. Y., 226;
Peters v. State, 96 Tenn., 682. And the Legislature may delegate its power
over fisheries to commissioners or local boards. Smith v. Levinius, 8 N. Y.,
472; Reed v. Dunbar, 41 Or., 509; State v. Cozzens, 2 R. I., 561. But all
similar bodies should not have unlimited and uncontrolled discretion.
Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md., 217; State ex rel., etc., v.
Cincinnati Gas Light & Coke Co., 18 Ohio St., 262. And the state may
limit these privileges of fishing to residents and citizens. State v. Hanlon,
77 Ohio St., 19; Chambers v. Church, 14 R. I., 398; McCready v. Virginia,
94 U. S., 391. But it must not exercise arbitrary discrimination against
any person or class of persons within its jurisdiction.- State v. Higgins,
51 S. C., 51; in re Ai Chong, 6 Sawy., 451; Bittenhaits v. Johnston, 92
Wis., 588.
INSURANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST-ASSIGNMIENT.--M'IANHATTA N LIFE
INS. CO. v. COHEN, 139 S. V., 51,(TEx.)-Held, that an assignment of a
life policy to one without an insurable interest is valid only to the extent
of reimbursing the assignee for the amounts paid out by him with interest,
being, except to that extent, a mere gambling contract, and contrary to
public policy.
There is considerable conflict of authority on this point. The rule
laid down in the principal case is upheld by the following cases: Hays v.
Lapeyre, 98 La., Ann., 749; First National Bank v. Terry's Adm'r., 99 Va.,
194; Strode v. Meyer Co., 101 Mo. App., 627. A few cases hold that an
assignment to one without an insurable interest avoids the policy. East
Missouri Valley Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 36 Kan., 146. But other courts hold
that a policy taken out in good faith, and not for the mere purpose of
assignment, is assignable to one having no insurable interest, and the
assignee, where the assignment is absolute and general, will be entitled to
the entire proceeds of the policy. Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 158 N. Y.,
24; Rylander v. Allen, 125 Ga., 206; New York Ins., Co. v. Armstrong, 117
U. S., 591; Farmers' Bank v. Johnson, 118 Ia., 282. But this is not true if
the assignment is merely to cover a wager policy. Fitzpatrick v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116. An assignment to one without an insurable inter-
est, of a policy taken out in contemplation of assignment, is void as
between insurer and assignee. Steinback %,. Diepenbrock, supra; Powell
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v. Dewey, 123 N. C., 103. And between asgignee and beneficiary. Vanor-
nier v. Hornberger, 142 Pa., 575. But it does not avoid the policy as be-
tween beneficiary and insurer. New York Ins. Co. v. Brown's Adm'r., 23
Ky., L. Rep., 2070; iMIerchants' Ins. Ass'n. v. Yoakum, 98 Fed., 251. An
assignment to a creditor who has no other insurable interest in the life of
the assured is valid where the amount of the debt is not disproportionate
to the face of the policy. Givens v. Veeder, 9 N. M., 256; McHale v.
McDonnell, 175 Pa., 632.
INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETY-IETHOD OF CHANGE OF BENE-
FICIARY.-HOLDEN V. MODERN BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICA, 132 N. W., 329
(TowA) .- Held, that a fraternal beneficiary association may stipulate
methods and conditions by and under which a substitution of beneficiaries
may be effected, and, unless such methods and conditions are adopted and
complied with, no substitution will take place.
The general rule is that whatever formalities a mutual benefit asso-
ciation prescribes as to change of beneficiaries must be observed and com-
plied with. Shuman v. A. 0. U. IV., 110 Iowa, 642; Gordon v. Gordon,
117 Ill. App., 91. Fink v. Fink, 171 N. Y., 616. And the expression of one
method impliedly excludes all others. Coleman v. Knights of Honor, 18
Mo. App., 189; Flowers v. Sovereign Camp, W. of the IV., 40 Tex. Civ.
App., 593; Grace v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Ass'n, 87 Wis., 562. So
the weight of authority holds that a change cannot be made by the will of
the member. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 64 Iowa, 534; McCarthy v. N. E.
Order of Protection, 153 Mass., 314. But, Catholic Benefit Ass'"n v. Priest,
46 Mich. 429, and Masonic Benefit Ass'n v. Bunch, 109 Mo., 560, hold
contra, when such change is not expressly forbidden. But these rules must
not be impossible of fulfilment. Grand Lodge v. Child, 76 Mich., 163. And
the change is valid where it is beyond the power of the member to comply
literally, through loss of the certificate. Isgrigg v. Schooley, 125 Ind., 94;
Marsh v. Ani. Legion of Honor, 149 Mass., 212; Lahey v. Lahey, 174 N. Y.,
146. The association may waive compliance, or be estopped to assert non-
compliance. Delaney v. Delaney, 175 Ill., 187; Wandell v. Mystic Toilers,
130 Iowa, 639; Manning v. A. 0. U. 14., 86 Ky., 136. Likewise the original
beneficiary may be estopped. Supreme Conclave v. Capella, 41 Fed., 1;
.llunshall v. Daly, 37 Ill. App., 628. And where the member has done all
in his power to comply, but dies before the new certificate is issued, the
change will be enforced. Sanborn v. Black, 67 N. H., 537; Lnhrs v. Lnhrs,
123 N. Y., 367; lValdnin v. Honistad, 119 Wis., 312.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-MUTUALITY OF REMEMDY-OPTION CONTRACT.
-AAYLOR V. PARKER, 139 S. W., 93, (TEX.)-Held, that an option, based
onm a valuable consideration moving from the holder of the option, even
though it imports no obligation on the holder to purchase, is an exception
to the rule that, if a contract can not be specifically enforced against the
one seeking enforcement, he is not entitled to such remedy as against his
adversary. Dunklin, J. dissenting in part.
In general specific enforcement of a contract will not be decreed un-
less the contract could be enforced by either party against the other. Buck
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v. Smith, 29 Mich., 166; Martiii v. Platt, 5 N. Y. St., 284. But where a qual-
ity necessary to make specific performance possible, though originally
lacking, is subsequently supplied, specific performance will be decreed.
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq., 349; Sayward v. Houghton, 119 Cal.,
545. This seems to be the real ground for the decision in the leading case,
and similar cases. An option contract is converted into a contract of sale,
which may be specifically enforced, by an acceptance by the offeree, within
the time agreed upon. Couch v. McCoy, 138 Fed., 696; Jones v. Barnes,
94 N. Y. Supp., 695; Chadsey v. Condley, 62 Kan., 853. But specific per-
formance will not be decreed where there has not been such an acceptance.
Pollock v. Brookover, 60 W. Va., 75. And the acceptance must be in exact
accord with the terms of the option. Henry v. Black, 213 Pa., 620; Pollock
v Brookover, supra. But specific performance will be decreed though
there be no consideration for the offer, where it was not withdrawn before
acceptance. R. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush., 224; Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 Ill.,
216. Contra, Litz v. Goosling, 93 Ky., 185.
STATUTES-UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE-EFFECT.-Ex PARTE BOCK-
HORN, 138 S. W., 706, (TEx.).-Held, that, since an unconstitutional act is
void from its inception, neither conferring rights, imposing duties, nor
affording protection, an act imposing a license tax on sellers of sewing
machines, unconstitutional in its inception as discriminating and non-
uniform, was not rendered valid by the subsequent repeal of the part of
the act rendering it unconstitutional.
The general rule is that an act amending an invalid or unconstitutional
act is void. Cowley v. Rushville, 60 Ind., 327; Plattsmouth v. Murply, 74
Neb., 749. But if the act is unconstitutional merely from a failure to com-
ply with the constitutional requirements in enacting it, it may be amended
into a valid act. Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Ia., 290; Walsh v. State, 142 Ind.,
357. And if a statute, constitutional when passed, is made invalid by the
adoption of a new constitution, it may be amended to comply with the new
constitution. Railway Co. v. Adams, 33 Fla., 608. Where only a section
or part of a section of an act is unconstitutional, the act may be amended
by removing the objectionable part or substituting another section, the
effect being to re-enact the old act with the amendment. State v. Cincin-
nati, 52 Ohio St., 419; Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo., 163; State v. Corbett, 61
Ark., 226. An act, although it purports to amend an unconstitutional act,
if it is complete in itself, is valid. People v. Onahan, 170 IIl, 449; People
v. Canvassers, 143 N. Y., 84; Mortgage Co. v. Hardy, 93 Tex.. 300. In
Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyce, 104 Fed., 172, there is a dictum that an act,
though invalid for any reason, may be amended. One recent case holds
that an unconstitutional statute may be amended into a valid act by mere
reference to it, for it is not properly void and nonexistent, but merely un-
enforceable. Allison v. Corker, 67 N. J. Law, 596.
SUNDAY-OPENING STORE-SCOPE OF STATUTE.-STATE V. MORIN, 80
ATLANTIC, (ME.), 751.-Held, Rev. St. c., 125, 25, prohibiting the keeping
open of a store on Sunday, does not prohibit a druggist to go into his
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store to compound a prescription in case of sickness, or to do an act of
necessity or charity; the statute merely prohibiting keeping open to invite
trade, transaction of business, or work in the store.
The rule laid down by the principal case is supported by the weight
of authority. The rule as stated in Doyle v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 118 Mass.,
195, is that, whatever proceeds from a sense of moral duty or a feeling of
kindness and humhnify, and is intetided' wholly for the purpose of the
relief or comfort of another, and not for ones own benefit, is not within
the meaning of the statute. In the case of Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Yopst, 118 Ind., 248, it was held, that jh determining whether an act is
within the meaning of the statute, it is proper to give just effect to the
nature of the business in which the person who does it is engaged. In a
Kansas case, the delivery of milk by a dairyman on Sunday, was deemed
to be a work of necessity and not prohibited by the Sunday law. City of
Topeka v. Hempstead, 58 Kans., 328. When a property right is in danger,
work done on Sunday to prevent loss, is deemed a work of necessity.
Johnson v. People, 42 Ill. App., 594; Morris v. State, 31 Ind., 189. The
running of trains carrying mail, freight, and perishable property has been
held a work of necessity. Commonwealth v. Rob, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. R., 473.
Likewise work done on Sunday, for public safety. Flag v. Inhabitance of
Millburg, 58 Mass., 243. In the case of Commonwealth v. Harrison, 77
Mass., 308, a shop was deemed to be open on Sunday if all who please can
obtain access thereto to buy, although the entrance is closed. Merely
keeping the doors of a store open on Sunday, without traffic is not a vio-
lation of a code which punishes one who keeps "open store on Sunday".
Snyder v. State, 59 Ala., 64.
